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CORPORATIONS AS CONDUITS: A
CAUTIONARY NOTE ABOUT REGULATING
HYPOTHETICALS
Douglas M. Spencer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In his first official State of the Union Address, President
Barack Obama publicly criticized the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens United1 and argued that the decision would
“open the floodgates for special interests, including foreign
corporations, to spend without limit in our elections.”2 President
Obama continued, “I don’t think American elections should be
bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests, or worse, by
foreign entities.”3 As Congress roared its approval, Justice Samuel
Alito, sitting in the second row, shook his head and said, “not
true.”4 In the wake of this exchange, empirical scholars have
examined the extent to which Citizens United has opened the
floodgates of spending in politics,5 empowered corporations and

*
© 2018, Douglas M. Spencer. All rights reserved. Professor of Law and Public Policy,
University of Connecticut. J.D., Berkeley Law; Ph.D. in Jurisprudence and Social Policy,
University of California, Berkeley; M.P.P., Goldman School of Public Policy, University of
California, Berkeley; B.A., magna cum laude, Columbia University. Many thanks to the
organizers of the Symposium “Can Corporations Be Good Citizens? How Corporate Law,
Litigation, Lobbying and Money in Politics Intersect”, to fellow panelists Gretchen
Goldman, Alex Hertel-Hernandez, and Costas Panagopoulos, and to the editors of the
Stetson Law Review. I also benefited greatly from conversations with and comments from
Jen Karr, Alexi Lahav, Jeremy McClane, and Peter Siegelman. All remaining errors and
weaknesses are mine.
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. Barack Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the
Union, (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=87433.
3. Id.
4. For video of the exchange, see Martin Kady II, Justice Alito Mouths ‘Not True,’
POLITICO (Jan. 27, 2010, 10:12 PM EST), http://www.politico.com/blogs/politiconow/2010/01/justice-alito-mouths-not-true-024608.
5. Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical
Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 330 (2014).
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special interest groups,6 shifted the partisan balance in state
legislatures,7 entrenched incumbents,8 and shaped policy
outcomes.9 Legal scholars have criticized the Court’s reliance on
the Free Speech Clause,10 the corporate personhood doctrine,11
binding precedent,12 and a narrow conception of political
corruption.13
Missing from all of this analysis and commentary is any sense
of whether foreign corporations and/or entities are in fact
bankrolling America’s elections, as President Obama warned. This
gap in our understanding of foreign influence after Citizens United
is not happenstance. First, Citizens United was not a case about a
foreign corporation or foreign political dollars—perhaps one reason
why Justice Alito was unable to maintain his poker face in

6. John C. Coates, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens
United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 657 (2012).
7. Tilman Klumpp, Hugo M. Mialon & Michael A. Williams, The Business of American
Democracy: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections, 59 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11–
12 (2016); Nour Abdul-Razzak, Carlo Prato & Stephane Wolton, How Outside Spending
Shapes American Democracy, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2823778
(last revised May 19, 2017).
8. Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, The Effects of Campaign Finance
Spending Bans on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the States About the Potential Impact
of Citizens United v. FEC, 33 ELECTORAL STUD. 102, 109 (2014).
9. Timothy Werner & John J. Coleman, Citizens United, Independent Expenditures,
and Agency Costs: Reexamining the Political Economy of State Antitakeover Statutes, 31 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 127, 128, 132, 154 (2014); Timothy Werner, The Sound, the Fury, and the
Non-Event: Business Power and Market Reactions to the Citizens United Decision, 39 AM.
POL. RES. 118, 123–27 (2011).
10. Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123
YALE L.J. 266, 415–17 (2013); Sonja West, Favoring the Press, 106 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 4, 6–10), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstractid=2913790.
11. Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle: Seeing and Sanctioning Political
Spending After Citizens United, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 455–56 (2012); Anne
Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate
Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 498–99, 505–06 (2010);
Matthew J. Allman, Note, Swift Boat Captains of Industry for Truth: Citizens United and
the Illogic of the Natural Person Theory of Corporate Personhood, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 387
(2011); Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 717,
720–22, 736–40 (2011).
12. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV.
581, 586 (2011); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 217, 217 n.3 (2010).
13. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF
BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 4–5 (2014); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY
CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 234–42 (2011); Richard Briffault,
Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 657–63 (2011); Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44
IND. L. REV. 243, 248–52 (2010); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned
Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 991–92 (2011).
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response to President Obama’s criticism.14 The majority opinion
does refer to foreign corporations, but only as an aside to note that
the challenged regulation was not properly tailored to achieve any
of the possible government interests, including “a compelling
interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from
influencing our Nation’s political process.”15 Justice Stevens
sounds the alarm on foreign corporations in his dissent to highlight
the untenable position of the majority that “the First Amendment
does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s
corporate identity.”16 Justice Stevens argued:
If taken seriously, our colleagues’ assumption that the identity
of a speaker has no relevance to the Government’s ability to
regulate political speech would lead to some remarkable
conclusions. . . . [For example] it would appear to afford the
same protection to multinational corporations controlled by
foreigners as to individual Americans: To do otherwise, after all,
could “enhance the relative voice” of some (i.e., humans) over
others (i.e., nonhumans).17

Despite the rhetorical posture of the Court in Citizens United,
our lack of information about the political activity of foreign
corporations is more directly due to weak corporate transparency
laws. Both corporate transparency laws and political transparency
laws fail to require the full disclosure of relevant financial
transactions, and state and federal agencies often fail to strictly
enforce the laws that are on the books.

14. Matthew Walther, Sam Alito: A Civil Man, AM. SPECTATOR (Apr. 21, 2014),
https://spectator.org/58731_sam-alito-civil-man/ (“When he tells me that he is done making
appearances at the State of the Union, I ask him about the last time he attended, in 2010,
when he mouthed what looked like the words ‘not true’ in response to President Obama’s
characterization of the Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. ‘I
don’t play poker,’ he says. ‘Either I should take it up so that I learn to have a poker face, or
it’s a good thing that I don’t because I’d lose a lot of money. People thought I said something.
I assume that they’re correct. I certainly thought it.’”).
15. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
16. Id. at 347 (Stevens, J., with Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784–
85 (1978)).
17. Id. at 424 (emphasis in the original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49
(1976)); see Hasen, supra note 12, at 584 (explaining that “it is unclear how, if the Court
took its own broad pronouncements in Citizens United seriously, it could possibly sustain
spending limits against foreign nationals and governments, who might seek to flood U.S.
election campaigns with money”).
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Corporations are required to disclose all expenditures made in
support of a political campaign to the Federal Election Commission
(“FEC”).18 Direct disclosure to the firm’s shareholders, however, is
not required.19 Corporations may also give money to political
committees, such as 527 organizations or Super Political Action
Committees (“PACs”) that use the corporation’s contribution to
support or oppose political candidates.20 These political committees
are required to disclose the source of their funds to the FEC, but
the corporations are not required to disclose these expenditures to
their shareholders. Corporations are banned from directly
contributing money to candidates running for any federal office.
Twenty-one states have a similar ban for state elections.21
However, twenty-three states do permit corporations to contribute
a limited amount of money to candidates for state office, and six
states allow unlimited corporate contributions directly to
candidates.22 The enforcement of these laws varies among the
states,23 and is generally considered to be weak and ineffectual.24
For many campaigns, the risk of violating these contribution and
disclosure laws, as well as any potential punishment, is seen as the

18. 11 C.F.R. § 110.11 (2017).
19. Id. § 110.11(f)(2); see Special Notices on Political Ads and Solicitation, FED.
ELECTION COMMISSION 7 (2006), https://www.fec.gov/pages/
brochures/spec_notice_brochure.pdf (citing to 11 C.F.R. 110.11(f)(2) with an explanation
that a disclaimer notice is not required for internal corporate/labor communications).
20. Note that I follow the conventional practice of identifying 527 organizations as those
that are not permitted to expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a specific candidate
or candidates. Technically, nearly all campaign committees, political parties, and Super
PACs are organized under Section 527 of the IRC, although these groups are permitted to
expressly advocate in favor or against candidates.
21. State Limits on Contributions to Candidates: 2015-2016 Election Cycle, NAT’L CONF.
OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/
legismgt/elect/ContributionLimitstoCandidates2015-2016.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
22. Id.
23. Some states have state enforcement agencies (e.g., California’s Fair Political
Practices Commission and Connecticut’s State Elections Enforcement Commission) while
other states rely on the state Attorney General or state prosecutors to enforce the law
through traditional civil or criminal litigation. State Ethics Oversight Agencies, NAT’L CONF.
OF
ST.
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/state-ethics-oversightagencies.aspx#California (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
24. Yue Qiu, How Does Your State Rank for Integrity? The 2015 State Integrity
Investigation Finds It Doesn’t Look Good, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/
2015/11/09/18822/how-does-your-state-rank-integrity; Mollie Bryant, Geoff Pender & Kate
Royals, No State Officials Enforce Campaign Finance Laws, CLARION-LEDGER (Mar. 5,
2016), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/
news/2016/03/05/public-officeprivate-gain-best-enforcement-practices/81206204/.
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cost of doing business.25 As a result, it is not always possible for the
public to observe corporate political activity.
Consider also that corporations may contribute money to
nonprofit 501(c) organizations that can use the corporation’s
contribution to support or oppose candidates and issues, so long as
this political activity is not the primary purpose or function of the
501(c). These tax-exempt 501(c) organizations are not required to
disclose their donors, and corporations are not required to disclose
contributions to a politically active 501(c) to their shareholders.
For President Obama and the dissenting Justices in Citizens
United, this unobserved corporate political activity opens the door
to foreign intrusion into American politics. Just the fact that
foreign corporations could possibly engage in political activity or
that foreign individuals could possibly funnel money to political
groups through undisclosed corporate channels was cause for
alarm.
During the 2016 election, the public observed foreign hackers
infiltrate four state voter registration databases and attempt to
hack into sixteen more.26 The public observed foreign hackers
release personal communications between Hillary Clinton and her
campaign manager and staff.27 But the public did not (and will
likely not be able to) observe the extent to which foreign dollars,
25. When Larry Noble was General Counsel at the FEC, he made the following
comment:
The argument is that violating the law has become the cost of doing business. I
can tell you in many cases this is true. I have talked to enough lawyers who
represent candidates who say that the classic conversation in the campaign room
consists of someone asking, “We want to do this and this. What are the
consequences?” Then the lawyer responds by saying, “We cannot do that. It is
illegal. After the election, the FEC will go after you.” To which the questioner
asks, “What is the fine?” Even if the penalty is a $20,000 fine, he is thinking,
“But this action will win the election. All right, thank you. Leave the room,
please.” I am serious. That scenario happens, and the lawyers get up and leave
the room.
Elizabeth Hedlund, Lawrence Noble, & Thomas O. Sargentich, Federal Election
Commission Panel Discussion: Problems and Possibilities, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 223, 232
(1994).
26. Mike Levine & Pierre Thomas, Russian Hackers Targeted Nearly Half of States’
Voter Registration Systems, Successfully Infiltrated 4, ABC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/russian-hackers-targeted-half-states-voter-registrationsystems/story?id=42435822.
27. See, e.g., 18 Revelations from Wikileaks’ Hacked Clinton Emails, BBC NEWS (Oct.
27, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37639370 (describing the content of
hacked emails from the Gmail account of John Podesta, chairman of Hillary Clinton’s 2016
campaign).
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funneled through corporations and nonprofits, impacted the 2016
elections. It is possible, perhaps likely, that no political spending
originated outside America’s borders. But the law fails to provide
a way to confirm this.28 This lack of transparency is not the result
of Citizens United; in fact, the Court in Citizens United upheld
disclosure and disclaimer requirements and argued that “prompt
disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens
with the information needed to hold corporations and elected
officials accountable for their positions and supporters.”29 One way
to make sense of Citizens United is to read the Court as confirming
the strong political rights of corporations because of its strong
belief in transparency.30 However, even if the majority took this
position, the transparency laws on the books are problematic,
regardless of how many times the Court upholds them.31
In this Article, prepared as part of a Symposium on the
intersection of corporations and money in politics, I illustrate the
various ways that corporations can spend their money to influence
politics in America and the relevant disclosure rules, or lack
thereof, that track this political activity. I also highlight
opportunities for individuals such as foreign nationals to exploit
corporate transparency loopholes to illegally spend money in
American politics, and question whether this evidence of possible
nefarious activity is adequate to justify regulations targeting
actual nefarious activity (I argue that the former is necessary but
not sufficient for the latter). Drawing on the logic of risk analysis,
I illustrate how the debate about hypothetical foreign campaign
28. At the time this Article went to press, Facebook, Google, and Twitter voluntarily
disclosed that Russian agents had uploaded more than 1,000 videos to YouTube, posted tens
of thousands of messages and videos on Facebook that reached more than 100 million users,
and published more than 130,000 messages on Twitter. Mike Isaac & Daisuke
Wakabayashi, Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through Facebook Alone, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/30/technology/facebook-google-russia.html.
29. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (majority
opinion).
30. Depending on one’s reading of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court in Citizens United did more than just
“confirm” corporate political rights. Some argue that the Court expanded corporations’
political rights. See, e.g., Robert Monks & Peter Murray, Is the Supreme Court Determined
to Expand Corporate Power?, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Aug. 25, 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/
08/25/is-the-supreme-court-determined-to-expand-corporate-power/.
31. See generally Abby K. Wood & Douglas M. Spencer, In the Shadows of Sunlight: The
Effects of Transparency on State Political Campaigns, 15 ELECTION L.J. 302 (2016)
(discussing, in depth, the Court’s position on transparency and its effects).
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activity parallels current controversies about voter fraud. Finally,
I argue that campaign finance laws have been created, justified,
implemented, and interpreted in relative isolation from one
another, creating unnecessary (though perhaps anticipated)
loopholes in enforcement that undermine the goals of oversight
and accountability in campaigns and elections. Campaign finance
regulations can only be effective if they are responsive to the
dynamic character of political campaigns. Thus, policymakers
should focus less on “comprehensive” reform that addresses
multiple aspects of campaign finance in relative isolation, and
focus more on “integrated” reform that treats the various channels
of campaign finance as dynamic, interconnected, and manipulable
by strategic actors.32
II. CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The modern stereotype of corporations is that they are
privately interested, profit-maximizing organizations with no
obligation to serve the public interest. This view of corporations is
justified by classical economic theory that promises socially
efficient, and therefore beneficial, outcomes when individuals and
firms are privately interested, because legal sanctions provide
protection against harm that individuals and firms might inflict on
others. This stereotype is reflected, at least in part, in practice. For
example, corporations that aim to incorporate public benefit into
their charter have adopted the moniker benefit corporations or “B
corporations.”33 This special designation (or disclaimer) is a recent
development.34 In the early years of the Republic, states provided
the benefits of the corporate form—e.g., limited liability, limited
risk of loss, eternal life, wealth protection—to interested parties in
exchange for a commitment that the corporation would serve the

32. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation,
and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804 (2014) (discussing, in depth,
political realism and campaign finance jurisprudence).
33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2017) (defining a public benefit corporation
as a “for-profit corporation . . . that is intended to produce a public benefit . . . and to operate
in a responsible and sustainable manner”).
34. See Suntae Kim et al., Why Companies Are Becoming B Corporations, HARV. BUS.
REV. (June 17, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/why-companies-are-becoming-b-corporations
(“The first generation of B Corporations was certified in 2007, and the number of firms
earning certification has grown exponentially ever since. Today there are more than 1,700
B Corporations in 50 countries.”).
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public interest.35 In addition to serving the public interest,
corporations were required to abide by several other statemandated regulations, such as limiting legal action to state courts,
operating for a specific stated purpose, not owning stocks in other
corporations, and not making political expenditures.36
Corporations almost immediately began to push back against
regulations, specifically the limited nature of corporate charters,
the power of states to alter or revoke these charters, and the
burdensome state and local taxes that adversely affected
revenues.37 As a result of two hundred years of regulation,
litigation, corruption, and compromise, corporate regulatory law
has become highly complicated, and these regulatory rules are
embedded in nearly every federal agency, in addition to multiple
agencies within each of the states and territories. This complex
web of rules, rights, and responsibilities has created numerous
avenues for corporations to legally engage in political activity. The
tangle of rules has also created loopholes that provide corporations
various avenues to hide that activity if they so wish.
Publicly traded corporations have the most expansive and
frequent disclosure requirements, and all disclosed information is
reported to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
and made available on the SEC website. This includes, among
other things, the names and ages of all directors, executive
compensation, audited financial statements, revenues generated
by major products, pending litigation, the equity of shareholders,
and the names of shareholders that agree that their names be
listed.38 Publicly traded corporations must also prepare an annual
35. THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE
THEFT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (2002); Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection: The
Early Role of Corporations in America, TRUTHOUT (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.truthout.org/opinion/item/735-unequal-protection-the-early-role-of-corporations-in-america
(“After all, if the people, through their elected representatives, are going to authorize a legal
limitation of liability for a group of people engaged in the game of business, it’s quite
reasonable to ask that the game be played in a way that throws off some benefit to the
government’s citizens or at least doesn’t operate counter to the public welfare.”).
36. See Jane Anne Morris, Fixing Corporations – Part 1: The Legacy of the Founding
Parents, ENVTL. RES. FOUND. (Apr. 4, 1996), http://www.rachel.org/?q=en/node/3953
(explaining corporate regulations in the 1800s).
37. A comprehensive history of corporate regulation is beyond the scope of this Article.
For a more in-depth overview of corporate regulation, see generally CIARA TORRESSPELLISCY, CORPORATE CITIZEN? AN ARGUMENT FOR THE SEPARATION OF CORPORATION AND
STATE (2016).
38. See Form 10-K: Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMMISSION 9–11, https://www.sec.gov/about/
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report for their shareholders. While publicly traded corporations
have discretion over what to disclose to shareholders, the content
of these reports is largely the same as SEC reports.39 Private
companies are regulated under state law and must submit their
articles of incorporation to their respective secretary of state as
well as documentation about their purpose, who controls the
company, and certain financial and other information as specified
in the law of each state.40 All of these disclosure requirements are
business-oriented, meaning their primary purpose is to ensure
that corporate laws are being followed and managers are making
sound business decisions. In other words, the goal of corporate
disclosure is to protect shareholders, not to expose them. When it
comes to political activity and money in politics, however,
disclosure rules enforced by the FEC are designed specifically to
expose the identity of speakers and their supporters.
A. Political Disclosure
In federal elections, every person who contributes at least
$250 to a candidate must disclose his or her name, address, and
occupation to the FEC.41 Forty-two states require candidates for
state office to disclose every single contribution regardless of size,

forms/form10-k.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (requiring the disclosure of, among other
things, directors, beneficial owners, executive officers, and executive compensation); see also
Form 10-Q: Quarterly Reports Under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMMISSION 5, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-q.pdf (last
visited Nov. 13, 2017) (requiring the disclosure of legal proceedings and other risk factors);
Form 8-K: Current Report: Pursuant to Section 13 of 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMMISSION 4–16, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (last
visited Nov. 13, 2017) (requiring the disclosure of, among other things, audited financial
statements, elected and departing directors, matters requiring a vote of shareholders, and
amendments to the firm’s code of ethics). Note that all beneficial owners (those that own
more than five percent of the common stock) must disclose their names and additional
information. Fast Answers: Schedule 13D, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerssched13htm.html (last modified Dec. 5, 2012).
39. See Fast Answers: Annual Report, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-annrephtm.html (last modified Oct. 15, 2014)
(noting that “[c]ompanies sometimes elect to send their annual report on Form 10-K to their
shareholders in lieu of, or in addition to, providing shareholders with a separate annual
report”).
40. For an overview of disclosure requirements for private corporations, see Howard
Liebman, Public Disclosure Requirements for Private Companies: U.S. Vs. Europe, JONES
DAY (Oct. 2012), http://www.jonesday.com/public_disclosure_requirements/.
41. Citizens Guide, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/
brochures/citizens.shtml (last updated Feb. 2017).
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while eight have thresholds ranging from $200 to $1000.42 Federal
law prohibits contributions to both federal and state candidates
from corporations, unions, foreign nationals, government
contractors, and contributions made in the name of another.43
Before 2010, this prohibition also applied to independent
expenditures, though Citizens United removed the ban on
corporations and unions.44 Any independent expenditure of at least
$250 in support of or opposition to a federal candidate must be
itemized and disclosed, including the name, address, and
occupation of the spender45 (state rules vary significantly with
respect to independent expenditures).46 Independent expenditures
can also be made via intermediary organizations, such as PACs,
527 committees, Super PACs, nonprofit social welfare
organizations organized under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code, or trade organizations organized under Section
501(c)(6).47 With the exception of 501(c) organizations, these
intermediary groups are subject to the same disclosure
requirements that individuals are. Because the primary purpose
or function of a 501(c) organization is not politics (and cannot be
under the law), the FEC does not require that 501(c)s publicly
disclose the source of their funding. The Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”), however, does collect information about donors to 501(c)
groups to ensure compliance with the Internal Revenue Code.48
Taken together, all of these disclosure rules generate a lot of
publicly available information that can be used by voters to inform
themselves, and to hold public officials and candidates for public
office accountable. While the disclosure of contributions to
42. State Campaign Finance Disclosure Requirements: 2015-2016 Cycle, NAT’L CONF. OF
ST. LEGISLATURES (July 17, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/
legismgt/elect/StateCampaignFinanceDisclosureRequirementsChart2015.pdf.
43. Citizens Guide, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/
citizens.shtml#prohibited (last updated Feb. 2017).
44. Making Disbursements as a PAC, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/
pages/brochures/indexp.shtml#Who_IE (last visited Nov. 13, 2017); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
45. FEC Form 5: Report of Independent Expenditures Made and Contributions Received,
U.S. SEC. & EX. COMMISSION 1, https://www.fec.gov/pdf/forms/fecfrm5.pdf (last visited Nov.
13, 2017).
46. States’ Independent Expenditure Reporting 2014, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/2014_Independent_Expenditures_Chart
.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
47. Form 8283: Noncash Charitable Contributions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 1,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8283.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
48. Id.
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candidates is relatively strict, the disclosure requirements for
independent expenditures are easier to avoid. There are two
separate approaches to avoiding disclosure, though individuals
and groups may engage in both simultaneously. The first
avoidance strategy is simply to give money to a 501(c) organization,
which is not required to disclose the identity of its donors and is
therefore sometimes referred to as a “dark group” or a group that
deals with “dark money” (a clever moniker used by advocates of
transparency to both describe and deride these groups).49 This
strategy comes at a cost, as 501(c) organizations cannot engage in
political activity as their primary activity, so most (or nearly most)
of the groups’ overall funding must be spent for non-political
purposes.50 Of course, one 501(c) could spend just under half of its
money on political activity and then donate the rest of its funds to
another 501(c), which could spend just under half of its money on
political activity and donate the rest of its funds to a third 501(c),
and so on.
The second disclosure-avoidance strategy parallels this
“Russian doll” strategy. Individuals or organizations can create a
shell corporation to hold their money, and this corporation can
make independent expenditures itself or give money to a Super
PAC or other political committees to make the independent
expenditures. This strategy does not guarantee full privacy/secrecy
should an enterprising investigator notice the donation to a Super
PAC by a corporation and track down information about that
corporation. As outlined above, however, private corporations are

49. Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php.
50. The conventional wisdom is that 501(c)s must spend less than half of their money
on political activities. However, the term “primary activity” is not clearly defined (50% of
funding? 50% of time and effort? 50% of impact?) and a proposed clarification to the rule by
the IRS has failed to materialize. See Prepared Remarks of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue Service John Koskinen Before the National Press Club, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-commissionerof-internal-revenue-service-john-koskinen-before-the-national-press-club-2014 (noting that
due to a record number of public comments on the proposed rule, “[i]t’s going to take us a
while to sort through all those comments, hold a public hearing, possibly repropose a draft
regulation and get more public comments. This means that it is unlikely we will be able to
complete this process before the end of the year.”). As of 2017, no new rule has been adopted,
and no clarification of the term “primary activity” has been published. Currently, the IRS
engages in a contextual “facts-and-circumstances test” to determine the primary purpose of
a 501(c) organization. Schedule A (Form 990 or 990-EZ): Public Charity Status and Public
Support, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 2, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990sa.pdf (last
visited Nov. 13, 2017).
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not required to disclose personal information about shareholders
or members besides the signatory of the articles of incorporation.
In a more extreme example, an individual could create separate
shell companies and place funds in the first (a private corporation),
which passes all of the funds to the second (a Super PAC), which
then forwards the money to the third (a 501(c)(4)) which spends
just less than half of the money on a political advertisement and
forwards the remaining funds to the fourth (a second 501(c)(4)),
which then spends just less than half of the money on additional
advertisements supporting a candidate, and donates the
remaining funds back to the private corporation. In this scenario,
neither the FEC nor the IRS (and thus the general public) can
identify the individual source of the expenditure. The FEC does not
require disclosure from either of the 501(c)(4)s that made the
independent expenditures, and the IRS, which does not formally
communicate with the FEC, evaluates the activity of each 501(c)(4)
independently.51 Once the IRS confirms that neither of the
501(c)(4)s engaged in political activity as its primary function—the
first 501(c)(4) spent less than half its funds on politics and more
than half its funds supporting another social welfare organization,
the second 501(c)(4) spent less than half its funds on politics and
more than half its funds on a private corporate client—the
investigation will likely stop.52 In this highly stylized example, an
individual can spend approximately seventy-five percent of her
money on independent expenditures and retain control over the
remaining twenty-five percent that is sitting in a shell corporation,
which can be dissolved after the election with little fanfare.

51. Robert Maguire & Viveca Novak, Shadow Money Magic: Five Easy Steps that Let
You Play Big in Politics, Hide Your Donors and Game the IRS – Step 2, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POL. (Apr. 16, 2013), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/04/shadow-money-magic-fiveeasy-steps-1/.
52. Note that the Center for Responsive Politics (a nonprofit 501(c) itself) has tried to
connect the dots between FEC reports and IRS reports and has identified several nonprofits
and corporations that spend “dark money.” The Center’s efforts are motivated by the idea
of “nondisclosure disclosure.” See Heather K. Gerken, Wade Gibson & Webb Lyons,
Rerouting the Flow of “Dark Money” into Political Campaigns, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rerouting-the-flow-of-dark-money-into-politicalcampaigns/2014/04/03/1517ac6e-b906-11e3-9a05c739f29ccb08_story.html?utm_term=.815b935c68da.
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B. Empirical Evidence of Undisclosed Spending
All of the prior scenarios assume that individuals and
corporations are interested in making independent expenditures.
By rule, these expenditures cannot be coordinated with political
campaigns, meaning the advertisements may or may not match
the campaign strategy of the spender’s preferred candidate.53
Further, to ensure anonymity, these individuals and/or
corporations must also be willing to give up control of their money
to a third (or fourth) party, or expend the time and resources to
incorporate one or more shell organizations. How likely are
individuals and corporations to do this? Empirically, the amount
of money spent on independent expenditures has skyrocketed since
Citizens United. In 2006, the last midterm election before Citizens
United, $70 million was spent nationwide on independent
expenditures related to federal races.54 In 2010, the first midterm
election after Citizens United, independent expenditures jumped
sharply to $310 million, and by 2014 independent expenditures
surpassed $558 million.55 In presidential election years,
independent expenditures increased from $338 million in 2008 to
$1 billion in 2012 and $1.4 billion in 2016.56 As a percentage of
spending by all federal candidates, independent expenditures grew
from just 6% of candidate spending in 2006 to 54% in 2014.57 In
presidential years, the percentage increased from just 8% in 2008
to 66% in 2016.58 The proportion of these independent expenditures
made by “dark groups” in federal races has also increased in the
wake of Citizens United, from $5 million in 2006 (or 7% of all
independent expenditures) to $136 million in 2010 (44%) to $178
million in 2014 (32%).59 The amount of undisclosed spending is
53. See generally Michael D. Gilbert & Brian Barnes, The Coordination Fallacy, 43 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 399 (2016) (criticizing the assumption (or expectation) that independent
expenditures are truly independent); Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88 (2013) (same); see also Michael S. Kang, The Brave New World
of Party Campaign Finance Law, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2016) (criticizing that
“coordination” is too narrowly construed under the law).
54. Outside Spending by Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See
generally
Election
Overview,
CTR.
FOR
RESPONSIVE
POL.,
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/index.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (providing a
year-to-year breakdown of candidate spending).
59. Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), supra note 49.
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even higher in presidential election years,60 and the same
disclosure-avoiding behavior has also been observed at the state
level.61 However, the hundreds of millions of dollars of “dark
money” circulating during each election cycle represent just a
fraction of overall spending in elections: 1.9% of all spending in
2008, 4.9% of in 2012, and 2.9% in 2016.62 This raises the question
of how pernicious “dark money” is in American politics, and how
much influence foreign corporations or foreign entities could have
on candidate recruitment, retention, and support.
Figure 1. “Dark Money” by Cycle: Total and Percentage of All
Spending63

60. Id.
61. See Spencer & Wood, supra note 5, at 347 (showing 100% increase in undisclosed
spending in 2010 compared to 2006).
62.
President
Congress
Total
Outside
Dark
Dark/Total
2006
—
$2,853m
$2,853m $70m
$5m
0.18%
2008
$2,800m
$2,486m
$5,286m $338m
$102m
1.93%
2010
—
$3,632m
$3,632m $310m
$136m
3.74%
2012
$2,621m
$3,664m
$6,286m $1,037m
$309m
4.92%
2014
—
$3,845m
$3,845m $558m
$178m
4.63%
2016
$2,387m
$4,058m
$6,444m $1,401m
$184m
2.86%
Cost of Election, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/cost.php
(last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (for a discussion on how the total cost of election is calculated,
scroll to the bottom of the page and click the “Methodology” hyperlink); Outside Spending,
CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ (last visited Nov.
13, 2017); Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/disclosure.php (discussing
reported dark money) (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
63. Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees, supra note 62.
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C. Foreign Political Activity
If individuals and corporations are protecting their
anonymity, should we be concerned that these individuals are
foreign nationals, or that foreign nationals fund these
corporations? There is nothing particularly controversial about
foreign participation in corporate governance, corporate activity,
or commercial activity more generally. Open economies are
generally agnostic about the identity of economic actors; it is their
behavior that matters.64 Adam Smith was not concerned about the
ethnicity of the butcher, or the religious beliefs of the brewer, or
the nationality of the baker. So long as these economic actors
behaved in an economically rational way, their identities were
trivial. When it comes to politics, however, personal identity—in
particular, citizenship—matters a great deal. The United States
government has been concerned about the corrupting influence of
foreign nationals, foreign corporations, and foreign governments
since the founding of the country.65 The United States Constitution
prohibits noncitizens from ever becoming the President of the
United States,66 and requires that individuals be citizens for seven
years (House) and nine (Senate) before being eligible to serve in
the United States Congress.67 The Constitution also explicitly
prohibits any federal official from accepting gifts and
“emoluments” from a foreign government without the consent of
Congress for fear that the official will develop a loyalty to the
foreign country at the expense of the United States.68 The Electoral
College was justified in the Federalist Papers as guarding against
foreign powers raising a Manchurian candidate. Alexander
Hamilton wrote that:
64. One ominous counterpoint to foreign corporate involvement was expressed by
former White House Senior Advisor Steve Bannon (before he worked in the White House)
who lamented that “‘[w]hen two-thirds or three-quarters of the CEOs in Silicon Valley are
from South Asia or Asia, I think . . . [a] country is more than an economy. We’re a civic
society.’” David A. Fahrenthold & Frances Stead Sellers, How Bannon Flattered and Coaxed
Trump on Policies Key to the Alt-Right, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-bannon-flattered-and-coaxed-trump-onpolicies-key-to-the-alt-right/2016/11/15/53c66362-ab69-11e6-a31b4b6397e625d0_story.html?utm_term=.5fd8b5acd7d0.
65. TEACHOUT, supra note 13, at 5; see Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 393 (2009) (arguing that corporations themselves lack the kind of
loyalty and patriotism that presumptively distinguishes natives from foreigners).
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
67. Id. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
68. Id. art. I, § 9.
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Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable
obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption.
These most deadly adversaries of republican government might
naturally have been expected to make their approaches from
more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign
powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How
could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their
own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention
have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most
provident and judicious attention [by creating the Electoral
College].69

The concern about foreign influence in the early years of the
Republic is understandable given the context that our burgeoning
confederation was trying to establish a united nation, independent
from foreign European powers. The United States Congress and
several states enacted scores of protective measures and
regulations against foreigners.70 These laws have nearly
universally been upheld in the face of First Amendment
challenges.71 First, it is not clear that the First Amendment even
applies to or protects foreigners. Second, even if the First
Amendment does apply to foreigners, the courts have recognized a
compelling state interest of preserving national boundaries,
broadly speaking, and of preventing foreign individuals or
associations from influencing our Nation’s political process more
specifically.72 These compelling interests are predicated on the
69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).
70. See, e.g., An Act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566
(1798) (extending the residency requirement for citizenship); An Act Concerning Aliens, ch.
74, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (authorizing the President to deport “dangerous” aliens); An Act
Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (authorizing the President to deport
aliens from nations at war with the U.S.); W. VA. CODE § 5-1-1 (2017) (authorizing the
governor to deport all “suspicious” subjects of any nation at war with the U.S).
71. Most of the cases addressing the rights of foreigners under the Constitution and the
jurisdiction of federal courts in protecting these rights have been raised in the context of
war and immigration, and have distinguished between foreigners on American soil versus
their home soil. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that prisoners
at Guantanamo Bay have a right to the writ of habeas corpus because the United States
retains de facto sovereignty over the prison in Cuba); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(extending state right of education to undocumented immigrants living in the U.S.);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that enemy aliens are outside the
jurisdiction of federal courts); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (holding that First
Amendment protections apply to foreigners living in the U.S.); see also U.S. v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures do not apply to foreigners living in a foreign country).
72. See Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565
U.S. 1104 (2012) (upholding a ban on campaign contributions by foreigners).
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assumption that foreigners lack the patriotism necessary to act in
America’s interest. The related, but unspoken, assumption is that
American citizens possess the patriotism that foreigners lack on
account of their citizenship. While this assumption is almost
certainly true on average, there are many exceptions on both
sides—unpatriotic Americans and American-loving foreigners.
Whether or not citizenship empirically serves as a reasonable
proxy for patriotism, the Supreme Court has held that as a matter
of law, citizenship is an acceptable (i.e., narrowly-tailored) brightline test for engaging in political activity.73
The worry about foreign influence over American elections has
persisted. In 1938, Congress passed the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (“FARA”) that requires any agent (i.e., lobbyist)
representing a “foreign principal” such as a foreign government,
political party, or foreign corporation to disclose their relationship
to the principal, information about their lobbying activity, and any
political expenditures.74 FARA was originally motivated by
concerns about Nazi propaganda circulating in the United States,
but was later amended to focus on more traditional lobbying
activity by foreign governments seeking a voice in public policy
debates.75
In the most recent presidential election, several advisors to
the Donald Trump campaign communicated with Russian
intelligence officials, including the Russian ambassador to the
United States.76 These interactions created a public outcry that
contributed to the forced resignation of President Trump’s
National Security Advisor (in part for not complying with FARA),
the arrest and guilty plea of one of his foreign policy advisors, the
recusal of the United States Attorney General from matters
related to Russia, and the investigation into President Trump’s
son-in-law for actions that a former CIA director likened to
espionage.77 Russia’s involvement in the 2016 presidential

73. Id.
74. Foreign Agents Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 75-583, 52 Stat. 631 (1938).
75. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–21 (2012).
76. Michael S. Schmidt, Mark Mazzetti & Matt Apuzzo, Trump Aides Had Contact with
Russian Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2017, at A1, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/14/us/politics/russia-intelligence-communications-trump.html?_r=0.
77. Maggie Haberman et al., Michael Flynn Resigns as National Security Adviser, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2017, at A1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/us/
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election, from repeated communications with the Trump
campaign, to hacking state voter registration databases and the
Democratic National Committee, is cause for great concern and a
wakeup call for reform. In contrast to daily headlines about
Russian hacking and the wall-to-wall coverage on cable news of the
Trump administration’s close ties to Russia, however, the public
has no idea the extent to which foreigners may have spent money
in support of certain candidates or in opposition to other
candidates, or whether Donald Trump is himself indebted to
foreign governments or corporations through his personal
businesses.
We know that foreign nationals have engaged in political
activity in the past,78 and the lack of both political and businessoriented corporate transparency raises the very real possibility
that foreigners could be influencing our elections without our
knowledge. The public is not blind to or unconcerned about these
vulnerabilities either. When the IRS proposed a rule to clarify the
“primary activity” standard for nonprofits that do not disclose their
donors, a record number of public comments were submitted
during the proposed rule’s notice and comment period.79 A few
years later, a new record was set at the SEC: more than 1.2 million

politics/donald-trump-national-security-adviser-michael-flynn.html; Matt Zapotosky et al.,
Three Former Trump Campaign Officials Charged by Special Counsel, WASH. POST (Oct. 30,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/manafort-and-former-business-partner-asked-to-surrender-inconnection-with-special-counsel-probe/2017/10/30/6fe051f0-bd67-11e7-959cfe2b598d8c00_story.html?utm_term=.675566da6a8f (“former Trump foreign policy advisor
George Papadopoulos admitted to making a false statement to FBI investigators who asked
about his contacts with foreigners claiming to have high-level Russian connections.”); Mark
Lander & Eric Lichtblau, Sessions Recuses Himself from Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2017, at A1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/us/politics/jeffsessions-russia-trump-investigation-democrats.html; Brooke Seipel, Ex CIA-Director: CIA
Would Consider Kushner Actions “Espionage,” THE HILL (May 27, 2017),
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/335398-ex-cia-director-if-kushner-set-upsecure-line-with-russia-cia.
78. See, e.g., James Bennet, Clinton Says Chinese Money Did Not Influence U.S. Policy,
N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/18/us/clinton-says-chinesemoney-did-not-influence-us-policy.html; Patrick McGreevy, Condom Measure Opponents
Fined for Taking Donations from Foreign Interests, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-measure-b-condom-campaign-fine-20151207story.html (outlining the case of foreign corporations giving money to ballot measure
committees in violation of state and federal law).
79. See Prepared Remarks of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service John Koskinen
Before the National Press Club, supra note 50 (“During the comment period, which ended in
February, we received more than 150,000 comments. That’s a record for an IRS rulemaking
comment period.”).
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public comments were submitted in response to the proposed rule
that corporations be required to disclose political expenditures to
their shareholders and to the SEC.80 Both the IRS and the SEC
have failed to implement their proposed rules (or any new rule),
and so the vulnerabilities that make foreign corporate involvement
possible still exist. What does not exist, however, is a consensus
about the risk that these vulnerabilities pose for American politics.
III. ASSESSING RISK: DISTINGUISHING
VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
Showing that fraud, corruption, or foreign infiltration is
possible does not prove that fraud, corruption, and foreign
infiltration is likely, or that it even happens. Just because it is
possible for nefarious actors to use corporations as conduits does
not mean that the practice is widespread. In other words, just
because a system is vulnerable does not mean that every possible
breach is a legitimate threat. In assessing risk in any context, one
must consider the following equation:
risk = likelihood * impact
where likelihood is a function of a threat exploiting a vulnerability,
and impact is a function of the value of the system or asset (i.e.,
the cost minus the benefit). To illustrate, think of the most
vulnerable entry points to a locked house or a locked car. Without
doubt, the easiest entry is through a window. Windows are brittle
and far easier to smash than a wooden or metal door. In fact,
windows are so easily broken that one can accomplish the task
with nearly any object or weapon, including a bare hand. If
windows are so vulnerable, then why do people install windows in
their homes where they keep their valuables? Why do automobile
companies manufacture cars with windows? The answer, of course,
is that the impact of windows—being able to see while driving,
natural light in one’s home, fresh air in one’s home or car—justify
80. See Lisa Gilbert, Political Spending Disclosure and the SEC, THE HILL (Mar. 28,
2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/274433-political-spending-disclosureand-the-sec (“44 U.S. senators, 70 investing endowed foundations, the founder of the largest
mutual fund in the country, a bipartisan group of former chairs and members of the SEC,
five state treasurers, pension funds, securities lawyers and a historic 1.2 million retail
investors have all asked the SEC to shine a light on unlimited corporate political spending
by requiring disclosure.”).
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the risk of being burglarized. The benefits of windows do not
outweigh all risks, however. In areas where the likelihood of being
burglarized is high, people install bars over their windows. In
areas where the likelihood of being burglarized is low, people do
not.81 This simple intuition can teach us a lot about regulating
hypotheticals, and recent debates about voter fraud crystalize the
problem perfectly.
A. Analyzing the Risk of Voter Fraud
One area of election law where the risk equation has been
badly misunderstood is the risk of voter fraud. Policymakers,
election administrators, lawyers, judges, and the general public
alike consistently fail to appreciate the difference between
vulnerabilities, threats, and risk in the context of voter fraud. In
recent years, several states have adopted strict voter identification
laws that have been sold to the public as necessary to prevent the
very serious risk of voter fraud.82 Proponents of voter ID provide
two kinds of evidence to support these new laws. First, they point
to known instances of voter registration fraud (e.g., paid signature
gatherers registering Mickey Mouse and members of the Dallas
Cowboys to vote),83 and absentee ballot fraud (e.g., stealing,
buying, and/or selling absentee ballots),84 even though voter ID
laws have zero impact on voter registration and absentee ballots.
Second, proponents of voter ID argue (and have shown) that it is
possible for a voter to impersonate somebody to vote more than
once.85 All of this evidence completely misses the point. Just

81. People are also likely to put bars on their windows when the value of their assets is
extremely high, even if the likelihood of burglary is relative low. I am grateful to Justin
Levitt for this metaphor.
82. Voting Laws Roundup 2017, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 10, 2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-2017.
83. Drew Griffin & Kathleen Johnston, Thousands of Voter Registration Forms Faked,
Officials Say, CNN (Oct. 10, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/
POLITICS/10/09/acorn.fraud.claims/.
84. Adam Liptak, Error and Fraud at Issue as Absentee Voting Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
7, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/us/politics/as-more-vote-bymail-faulty-ballots-could-impact-elections.html.
85. See, e.g., John Fund, Democrats Dismiss Voter-Fraud Worries, but Reality Intrudes,
NAT’L REV. (Aug. 7, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438754/james-okeefevoter-fraud-videos-prove-voter-frauds-real (highlighting the work of James O’Keefe who
showed that it is possible to get a ballot on behalf of somebody who recently died or who is
a noncitizen from election officials without showing a photo ID, and citing a Pew report that
2.8 million people are registered to vote in two or more states).
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because something is possible (e.g., smashing a window) does not
mean that strict rules are required to prevent it (e.g., putting bars
over all windows). The notorious videos produced by conservative
provocateur James O’Keefe that show him trying to vote without a
voter ID are analogous to a video of somebody walking down a
residential street full of houses with windows and pointing to all of
the places where there are rocks, sticks, and pieces of concrete, all
of which could easily smash the windows. Importantly, these
weapons have not been used, which is why the hypothetical
homeowners have not put bars on their windows.
In the case of voter impersonation fraud, the possible has not
materialized into the actual. How do we know? First, very few
people have ever been caught or prosecuted for voter
impersonation fraud.86 Admittedly, prosecutions are not the best
metric of criminal incidence because of prosecutorial discretion,
and because successful fraud entails not getting caught. In the case
of voting, however, every person who casts a ballot is recorded as
such on the voter rolls, which are publicly available and therefore
available for audit.87 By investigating the voter rolls, one can
observe whether people who have died in the previous year appear
as having voted, or whether the same individual appears on two
different state lists.88 When these audits are conducted, evidence
of voter impersonation fraud has emerged in a small number of
cases. The most cited figure is that voter impersonation fraud
accounts for 0.000000031% of ballots cast between 2000–2014.89 In
other words, the risk of voter impersonation fraud is low because

86. Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 9, 2007),
http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/truth-about-voter-fraud; see Election Fraud in
America, NEWS21 (Aug. 12, 2012), http://votingrights.news21.com/interactive/electionfraud-database/ (reporting 0.5% of cases as voter impersonation fraud); Voted Fraud Cases,
HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/voterfraud/
search?name=&state=All&year=&case_type=All&fraud_type=23746 (last visited Jan. 1,
2018) (noting thirteen cases of voter impersonation since 2004).
87. For information on how to acquire voter files in all fifty states, see Michael
McDonald, Voter List Information, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT (Aug. 22, 2015),
http://voterlist.electproject.org/.
88. Greg Palast, The GOP’s Stealth War Against Voters, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 24, 2016),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/the-gops-stealth-war-against-votersw435890.
89. Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31
Credible Incidents Out of One Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensiveinvestigation-of-voter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballotscast/?utm_term=.c70f3ed34e50.
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the likelihood is infinitesimally small. And the likelihood is small
because voter impersonation fraud is highly illogical. Voting twice
is vanishingly unlikely to make a difference in the outcome of an
election, and any election that is decided by one vote or that ends
in a tie is going to draw an enormous amount of public scrutiny
and investigation during the recount process. Thus, proponents of
voter ID laws have not only oversold their case of fraud to the
public, they have also possibly helped enact a self-defeating law.
Potential voters who do not have an ID and cannot, or do not want
to, get one may opt to vote via absentee ballot, where evidence of
fraud is much higher.90 In fact, thirteen elections have been
invalidated due to absentee ballot fraud in the past forty years,
while not a single election has been overturned due to voter
impersonation fraud.91 By misunderstanding the relationship
between risk, vulnerabilities, and threats, proponents of voter ID
laws may have unwittingly increased the very fraud they allegedly
sought to snuff out.92
It is worth pointing out that opponents of voter ID have
similarly mischaracterized the risk of voter ID laws and therefore
have also undermined the credibility of their position. For
example, the Brennan Center for Justice repeatedly highlights
that eleven percent of eligible voters do not have government-

90. See generally The Truth About Voter Fraud, supra note 86, at 34 n.16 (“Most
proposals to require photo identification of voters do not address the absentee voting
process, where fraud through forgery or undue influence, often directly implicating
candidates or their close associates, is far more of a threat.”); A Sampling of Election Fraud
Cases from Across the Country, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/docs/pacei-voterfraudcases.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (noting 170
cases of absentee ballot fraud, compared to just thirteen cases of voter impersonation fraud
in its sample). Voter Fraud Cases, supra note 86.
91. Absentee ballot fraud invalidated elections in the following cases: McClendon v.
Hodges, 272 SW.3d 188 (Ky. 2008); United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440 (S.D. Miss.
2007) aff’d, 561 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2009); Pabey v. Patrick, 816 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. 2004);
Straughter v. Collins, 819 So. 2d 1244 (Miss. 2002); Womack v. Foster, 8 S.W.3d 854 (Ark.
2000); Adkins v. Huckabay, 755 So. 2d 206 (La. 2000); Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113
(Ala. 1999); In re Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots, 725 So. 2d 1108 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1998); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1994); Gooch v. Hendrix, 851 P.2d
1321 (Cal. 1993); Stebbins v. White, 190 Cal.App.3d 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Kiehne v.
Atwood, 604 P.2d 123 (N.M. 1979); Petition of Byron, 398 A.2d 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978).
92. Many have argued that proponents of voter ID laws have not been genuinely
concerned about voter fraud, but instead have been concerned about strengthening the
position of the Republican party. Keith G. Bentele & Erin O’Brien, Jim Crow. 2.0? Why
States Consider and Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSPS. ON POL. 1088, 1089
(2013); William D. Hicks et al., A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and
Partisan Competition in the American States, 68 POL. RES. Q. 18, 19 (2015).
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issued photo ID and could be disenfranchised by a voter ID law.93
The Economist argues that as many as six hundred thousand
minority and young Texans could be prevented from voting
because of the state’s proposed voter ID laws.94 These numbers
reflect the possible disenfranchising impact of voter ID, but fail to
account for people who can easily get an ID and people who are
unlikely to vote, whether or not they have ID. So, what is the actual
disenfranchising impact of voter ID laws? To date, no systematic
causal analysis has been able to isolate the effect of voter ID on
turnout.95 Anecdotally, the estimated number of disenfranchised
voters is much lower than critics have predicted. In the 2007
Marion County municipal elections, Indiana’s voter ID law
suppressed the vote of at least thirty-two voters.96 In the 2008
general election, 1,039 voters in Indiana were required to cast a
provisional ballot because they lacked voter ID. More than 900 of
these ballots were not counted (of more than 2.8 million ballots cast
in the state).97 In 2012, more than 640 provisional ballots that were
cast due to lack of voter ID were never counted (of more than 2.6
million ballots cast in the state).98 In 2012, Kansas reported that
84 voters were disenfranchised due to the state’s voter ID law.99 In
2016, the Wisconsin Election Commission reported that at least
399 voters were disenfranchised by the state’s voter ID law.100
These numbers all suggest that voter ID has a smaller
disenfranchising effect than many feared. On the other hand, there

93. Voter ID, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voterid (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).
94. A Texas Law Could Disenfranchise 600,000 Voters, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2016/05/got-id.
95. For a good discussion of the measurement challenges related to voter ID, see Daniel
J. Hopkins et al., Voting but for the Law: Evidence from Virginia on Photo Identification
Requirements, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 79 (2017) (showing that, even with precinctlevel data on turnout and photo ID, the effects of voter ID are confounded by external events
such as voter mobilization efforts that, by design, correlate with rates of photo ID
possession).
96. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 217 (2008).
97. Michael J. Pitts & Matthew D. Neumann, Documenting Disfranchisement: Voter
Identification During Indiana’s 2008 General Election, 25 J. L. & POL. 329, 330 (2009).
98. Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Measuring the Impact of Photo ID over Time and Its
Impact on Women, 48 IND. L. REV. 605, 612 (2015).
99. Wendy R. Weiser, 84 Votes Too Many, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 23, 2012),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/84-voters-too-many.
100. Matthew DeFour, At Least 399 Votes Not Counted Because Voter Didn’t Provide
Valid ID, WIS. ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2016), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-andpolitics/at-least-votes-not-counted-because-voter-didn-t-provide/article_de3374f7-5c23595c-9857-c885814560ff.html.
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is strong evidence that the number of disenfranchised voters is still
dramatically higher than thirty-one, which is the approximate
number of impersonated votes cast nationwide in all elections
between 2000–2014.101 A simple cost-benefit analysis should
instruct the public to view voter ID laws more skeptically than it
currently does.102
One final consideration is that because voter impersonation
fraud can only be detected by auditing the publicly available voter
file, voter impersonation fraud arguably cannot be rooted out ex
ante. This is a legitimate concern in election law cases where
traditional damages do not apply, and where judges are very
hesitant to order a new election. On the other hand, the
punishment for knowingly voting illegally can be quite stiff, so
voter impersonation fraud can certainly be deterred.103 What is
important is that voter impersonation fraud (and absentee ballot
fraud) can be detected by auditing the publicly available voter files.
The same cannot be said about campaign finance fraud.
B. Analyzing the Risk of (Foreign) Corporate Political Activity
One major difference between voter fraud and corporate
campaign finance fraud is that an investigator cannot track down
every single campaign contribution to its roots. So, while the logic
of risk assessment holds in the campaign finance context (risk =
likelihood * impact), the likelihood that foreigners are channeling
political expenditures through American corporations will never be
known with much certainty unless the law is changed. There is
evidence that foreign involvement is greater than zero. For
example, in 2012, concerned citizens in Los Angeles gathered
enough signatures to qualify a ballot initiative that would require
actors in adult films to wear condoms while performing sex acts on
screen (among other things).104 Opponents of the initiative, called
101. Levitt, supra note 89; see Lorraine C. Minnite, The Misleading Myth of Voter Fraud
in
American
Elections,
SCHOLAR
STRATEGY
NETWORK
(Jan.
2014),
http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/misleading-myth-voter-fraud-americanelections (reporting just six cases of voter impersonation fraud from 2000–2012).
102. Justin McCarthy, Four in Five Americans Support Voter ID Laws, Early Voting,
GALLUP (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/194741/four-five-americans-supportvoter-laws-early-voting.aspx.
103. Mexican Woman in Texas Sentenced to 8 years in Prison for Voter Fraud, FOX NEWS
(Feb.
11,
2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/02/11/mexican-woman-in-texassentenced-to-8-years-in-prison-for-voter-fraud.html.
104. McGreevy, supra note 78.
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“Measure B,” created a campaign committee that was funded by
one U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation and one foreign
subsidiary of the same foreign corporation, which was managed by
a foreign national. The campaign committee raised $343,000 from
the U.S. subsidiary and $75,000 from the foreign subsidiary in
clear violation of the long-standing ban on foreign nationals and
foreign corporations from spending any money “in connection with”
U.S. elections.105 The perpetrators were caught because they made
no attempt to hide their identities. It is unknown the extent to
which other foreign entities have hidden their identities in an
attempt to influence a political campaign.106
While the constitutional concerns associated with voter fraud
are not identical to the constitutional concerns associated with
corporate political disclosure, there is some irony in the fact that
those who claim voter fraud is rampant because it is possible cast
a more moderate tone when predicting the likelihood of foreign
political involvement or defending corporate disclosure
avoidance.107
105. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A); McGreevy, supra note 78. Note that the FEC deadlocked
on whether Section 30121 applied to ballot committees. McGreevy, supra note 78. The
campaign committee thus escaped punishment from the FEC, but was fined $61,500 by the
California Fair Political Practices Commission. Id.
106. There are also examples of foreigners who have attempted to support candidates
without using the corporate form to conceal their identity. See, e.g., Campaign Finance Key
Player: Yah Lin ‘Charlie’ Trie, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/politics/special/campfin/players/trie.htm (“The investigation found that some of the
[foreign] money came from sequentially numbered money orders, supposedly from different
people in different cities, but all apparently signed in the same handwriting.”).
107. Compare Hunter Woodall, Kris Kobach Was a Source of Donald Trump’s Voter
Fraud Allegation, Conway Says, KAN. CITY STAR (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.kansascity.com/
news/local/news-columns-blogs/the-buzz/article118434743.html) (where Kansas Secretary
of State Kris Kobach defended President Trump’s claim that three to five million votes were
illegally cast) with John Celock, Kris Kobach Considered Unlikely to Implement Citizens
United Disclosure Rules in Kansas, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/08/19/kris-kobach-citizens-united_n_3779905.html (where Kris Kobach did not favor
disclosure for politically active 501(c)(4) organizations); compare also Jennifer Matthes &
Hans von Spakovsky, When Zombies, Aliens, and Felons Steal Our Votes, DAILY SIGNAL
(Oct. 7, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/10/07/when-zombies-aliens-and-felons-steal-ourvotes/ (where Heritage Foundation Senior Legal Fellow Hans von Spakovsky complained
about voter fraud), with Hans A. von Spakovsky, Forced Donor Disclosure Is Bad for
Democracy, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2016/feb/8/hans-von-spakovsky-forced-donor-disclosure-is-bad-/ (where Hans von
Spakovsky warns that campaign finance disclosure is dangerous). This irony, however, does
have a mirror. See, e.g., Bob Bauer, former Obama White House Counsel and co-chair of the
Presidential Commission on Election Administration, who has argued that “‘[a] virtual
cottage industry of voter fraud alarmism has sprung up to shake public confidence in the
voting systems,’” Leandra Bernstein, Experts Say Trump’s Voter Fraud Commission Is a
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While it makes no sense to assume the worst (that every
undisclosed dollar is spent by nefarious foreign agents), two
important considerations distinguish the campaign finance
context from the voter fraud context: (1) although there is little to
no evidence that candidates solicit the vote of ineligible
populations, there is evidence that political consultants exploit
corporate loopholes;108 and (2) there is no way to effectively audit
campaign finance reports to catch willful fraudsters. This lack of
transparency undercuts the position, devoid of any context, that
corporations have First Amendment rights that cannot be
infringed.109 Relatedly, the lack of transparency makes it
impossible to assess the tradeoffs of different regulations, since we
cannot understand the risks of extending strong First Amendment
rights to corporations.110 This leaves the courts in a position to
speculate on these tradeoffs with no empirical grounding. One
example of this speculation is the Court’s decision in McCutcheon
v. FEC to invalidate the aggregate limit for giving to political
Solution in Need of a Problem, WJLA ABC NEWS (May 12, 2017),
http://wjla.com/news/nation-world/trump-voter-fraud-commission, yet is one of the
country’s foremost champions of campaign finance disclosure. Robert F. Bauer & Samuel
Issacharoff, Keep Shining the Light on “Dark Money,” POLITICO (Apr. 12, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/keep-shining-the-light-on-dark-money116901; UC Irvine Law Professor Rick Hasen who argues that voter impersonation is
“extremely rare,” Rick Hasen, Don’t Point to Voter Registration Fraud, or Absentee Ballot
Fraud, to Defend Trump’s Irresponsible Vote-Rigging Claims, ELECTION L. BLOG (Oct. 2,
2016), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=87081, but also advocates for disclosure to root out
foreign political activity, Show Me the Donors, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/politics/2010/10/show_me_the_donors.html); and Douglas Spencer
(Author) who argues that voter impersonation fraud is exceedingly rare, supra Part II(A),
yet has also argued in favor of “stricter [campaign finance] disclosure requirements than
the status quo” (though not for fear of corporate or foreign political activity), Spencer &
Wood, supra note 5, at 358.
108. See Hedlund, Noble & Sargentich, supra note 25, at 226–28 (discussing the
enforcement of election laws and the need to close loopholes in them).
109. The Court suffers from its own decision to create a balancing test between individual
rights and First Amendment rights. See generally Jacob Eisler, The Deep Patterns of
Campaign Finance Law, 49 CONN. L. REV. 55, 116 (2016) (noting that individual rights and
the First Amendment “dovetail, as both protect citizen autonomy and the ability to ensure
the proper causal relationship between popular will and government action.” Furthermore,
when the Court relies on the First Amendment to evaluate campaign finance regulations,
the analysis “cannot be addressed merely by asking, simplistically, if there is a first-order
impact on the ‘amount’ of speech or association. Rather the inquiry must be more nuanced
and must determine how much the chilling effects of the measure worsen the political
position . . . of the mass of voters”).
110. See Spencer & Wood, supra note 5, at 356 (“Lack of quality data prevents an
evaluation of both assumptions underlying campaign finance laws and the effects of the
laws and decisions that emerge based on those assumptions.”).

2018]

Corporations as Conduits

251

candidates in federal elections.111 The majority opinion, by Chief
Justice Roberts, and the dissent, by Justice Breyer, read like a
battle of competing hypotheticals. Justice Breyer describes various
scenarios that he thinks are possible while Chief Justice Roberts
argues about what he thinks is plausible. Justice Breyer argues
that a clever contributor could now circumvent the individual
contribution limit by creating one hundred political action
committees and donating the maximum PAC contribution to a
single candidate one hundred times.112 Chief Justice Roberts
argues that this circumvention is “highly implausible” because of
various anti-earmarking provisions that have been enacted over
the years.113 But these anti-earmarking provisions were added
precisely because there was actual (or feared) circumvention, and
neither the majority nor the dissent provide any empirical
evidence to support their claim that the ruling was a major setback
(dissent) or a fine-tuning to the law (majority).114
In short, it would not be responsible to presume that foreign
dollars are dominating the political landscape, or that foreigners
are systematically attempting to influence American elections just
because it is possible. In fact, we know that no more than about
five percent of political spending could even come from foreign
sources. However, the fact that hundreds of millions of dollars are
unaccounted for in each election opens the door to unnecessary
conspiratorial rhetoric because, well, “there’s no way to know for
sure” how much foreign money is influencing our elections.115 Weak
transparency also forces the Supreme Court to speculate on the
determinants of certain political outcomes and the impact of
various regulations and reforms, ungrounded in empirical
evidence. Perhaps it is time to rethink how courts evaluate
regulations of the political process given the state of disclosure
laws on the books and in practice.

111. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
112. Id. at 1474–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1453 (majority opinion).
114. For example, one relevant piece of information would be to know how many donors
ran up against the aggregate limit in the previous decade.
115. See The 10 Things They Won’t Tell You About Money in Politics: Dollars from Doha,
Dakar, or Dengzhou, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/
resources/10things/08.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (“Unfortunately, it’s impossible to say
how much foreign money is influencing our elections. . . . There’s no evidence that this
scenario has occurred recently or that the IRS has investigated such cases. But there’s no
way to know for sure.”) (emphasis added).
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IV. INTEGRATED CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Pam Karlan and Sam Issacharoff famously compared money
in politics to water, and argued that, “Money, like water will seek
its own level.”116 They continued, “The price of apparent
containment may be uncontrolled flood damage elsewhere.”117 In
other words, Karlan and Issacharoff argued that money in politics
is hydraulic. Like the game of whack-a-mole, when reformers limit
or ban money in one particular channel (e.g., campaign
contributions) they are likely to see money pop up later in other
channels (e.g., independent expenditures). This hydraulic
metaphor has become a central theory in the debates over effective
campaign finance reform,118 although the theory is descriptive and
not normative, and thus is aimed at the problem and not the
solution.
To the extent that the hydraulic metaphor is an accurate
description of money in politics, regulators and enforcers would do
well to embrace campaign finance reform through the same lens.
Call this the normative hydraulic theory—one that informs the
rulemaking and jurisprudence in campaign finance. To
understand what I mean by this, consider the history of modern
campaign finance reform, from the Tillman Act in 1907, to the
Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) in the 1970s, to the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) in 2002, and
everything in between. These reforms addressed different kinds of
money (the “what” of campaign finance), and also different sources
of that money (the “who” of campaign finance). Consider the
various “whats” of campaign finance: campaign contributions, inkind donations, independent expenditures, issue advertisements,
electioneering communications, and patronage. Examples of the
“who” of campaign finance include corporations, unions, political

116. Pamela S. Karlan & Samuel Issacharoff, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1999).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 40
(2012) (“What has occurred since Citizens United should be described as ‘reverse
hydraulics.’”); RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND
POLITICAL POLARIZATION: WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL 1, 110 (2014) (“Like water, money finds a
way to get around obstacles.”); Sarah C. Haan, The CEO and the Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Deregulation, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 28 (2014) (“Unfortunately, the
‘deregulate and disclose’ approach of the Roberts Court is unlikely to solve the hydraulics
problem that frustrates courts and law professors.”).
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parties, foreigners, minors, civil service employees, millionaires,
donors, and other financial allies.
Nearly all campaign finance laws address both “whos” and
“whats.” For example, the Tillman Act119 banned contributions by
corporations, the Hatch Act120 regulated campaign activity by
government employees, the Smith-Connally Act121 banned unions
from making contributions, and the Taft-Hartley Act122 restricted
unions from making independent expenditures. At certain times,
Congress has enacted “comprehensive” campaign finance reform
laws. These laws were “comprehensive” because they regulated
several “whats” and many “whos” at the same time. For example,
the 1974 amendments to the FECA banned contributions from
corporations and unions, strictly limited contributions and
expenditures by individuals, and set spending limits for
candidates.123 In 2002, the BCRA banned contributions from
minors
and
foreign
entities,
regulated
electioneering
communications by broadcast media, and banned soft money
activity by political parties, among other things.124
In the courts, campaign finance regulations of the “whos” and
“whats” have been evaluated separately and neither has fared
particularly well. Regulations that target “who is giving” or “who
is spending” have proven unsuccessful in large part because the
Supreme Court has not accepted the equality rationale that would
justify regulations giving the “whos” an equal footing on a level
playing field.125 Some regulations that target the “whats” have also
fared poorly because the “what” can be difficult to constitutionally
119. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864b (1907).
120. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activity, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501–08 (1939).
121. War Labor Disputes Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
122. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
123. FECA Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 101 (1974).
124. BCRA Amendment, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
125. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 741–42 (2008) (“We have
similarly held that the interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups
to influence the outcome of elections’ cannot support a cap on expenditures for ‘express
advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates,’ as ‘the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
48–49) (1976)); see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003) (“[W]e
have noted that ‘[p]olitical “free trade” does not necessarily require that all who participate
in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources.’”) (quoting Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 705 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he notion that the
government has a legitimate interest in restricting the quantity of speech to equalize the
relative influence of speakers on elections is antithetical to the First Amendment . . . ”).
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articulate. For example, in Buckley, the Supreme Court
invalidated limits on independent expenditures because the term
“independent expenditure” was too vague.126 When Congress
attempted to clarify “independent expenditure” in 2003 by
identifying criteria for electioneering communications, the Court
in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life held that the criteria were both
too broad and too narrow.127
The Court’s analysis of these issues misses the point in my
opinion, which is that the “whos” and the “whats” are
interconnected. In other words, as the “what” becomes more
challenging to articulate, the “who” becomes more important.
Conversely, as the “who” becomes less regulated the “what”
becomes that much more important. The central intuition is that
courts should be willing to allow more wiggle room in certain
dimensions of campaign finance law when the realities of the
regulation and the political environment dictate. Similarly,
campaign finance reformers should place less emphasis on
“comprehensive” reform and hone their focus on “integrated”
reform by recognizing that the moving parts of campaign finance
are interconnected. A nice illustration of this distinction is found
in the BCRA of 2002.128 This “comprehensive” reform targeted both
“whos” and “whats” but also the additional dimension of “when.”
In the case of the “whos” and “whats,” BCRA failed to appreciate
the strategic response of political actors to the law’s ban on soft
money. Banning soft money transactions by political parties drove
more spending to outside groups—nonprofits, independent
political committees, and special interest groups—which were
largely ignored in the law.129 On the other hand, Congress properly
sensed the integrated relationship between the “what” and the
126. 424 U.S. at 76 (“In its effort to be all-inclusive, however, the provision raises serious
problems of vagueness . . . ”).
127. 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (On electioneering communications as too broad: “BCRA’s
definition of ‘electioneering communication’ is clear and expansive” and “the First
Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than
suppressing it.” On electioneering communications as too narrow: “We conclude that the
speech at issue in this as-applied challenge is not the functional equivalent of express
campaign speech. We further conclude that the interests held to justify restricting corporate
campaign speech or its functional equivalent do not justify restricting issue advocacy”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
128. Pub. L No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
129. See DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE
SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 23–27 (2014) (charting the shift from candidateand party-centered spending to nonprofits, super PACs, and other political organizations in
the wake of McConnell v. FEC in 2003 and Citizens United in 2010).
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“when,” and therefore defined a new kind of “electioneering
communication” in terms of when it was made—thirty days before
a primary or sixty days before a general election. By recognizing
that political advertisements, both candidate-centered and issue
ads, are much more valuable to a candidate in the days leading up
to an election, Congress responded with dynamic regulation.
In another example, the Supreme Court in Citizens United
appeared to take account of the integrated nature of campaign
finance by upholding disclosure and disclaimer requirements while
also striking down a ban on independent expenditures by
corporations.130 Campaign finance disclosure is often promoted as
a way to constitutionally regulate money in politics when the “who”
and the “what” become slippery. If it is too difficult to regulate who
spends money, or what they spend their money on (e.g., issue ads
vs. advocacy), then courts should be open to regulations about how
people spend their money. For example, we may care less about
the “who” or “what” when the law precludes coordination with the
candidate, or when the law requires disclosure. In the words of the
Supreme Court, “disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more
comprehensive regulations of speech.”131 Interestingly, the
Supreme Court has not tolerated any uncertainty over the “what”
(e.g., the line between issue and express advocacy), but it does
tolerate a good deal of wiggle room over the “how” (e.g., the line
between independent and coordinated expenditures). While some
view the Court’s position on these issues as unprincipled,132 in a
system where uncertainty in the “how” is tolerated because of
problems with the “what,” the Court’s position becomes more
defensible. Reading Citizens United through this lens provides a
new understanding of the outcome, and a new argument for
overturning the decision in the future. One way to make sense of
Citizens United is to read the Court as confirming the strong
political rights of corporations because of the Court’s nearunanimous endorsement of transparency rules. To the extent that
disclosure and disclaimers are widely adopted and enforced (as
upheld by the Court in Citizens United), the political involvement
of corporations poses less of a threat. On the other hand, in a world
130. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 318 (2010).
131. Id. at 369 (internal citation omitted).
132. See, e.g., Gilbert & Barnes, supra note 53, at 402 (pointing to a “fallacy of the
Supreme Court’s making at the heart of campaign finance: the belief that coordination
relates in an operational way to corruption”).

256

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. 47

where more and more people distrust organized business, where
concerns over foreign political activity and influence are
particularly salient, and where more spending is going
underground (i.e., where disclosure is not being enforced), the
Court should be more tolerant of regulations of the “who”
(corporations) and the “what” (independent expenditures). In other
words, if the deregulation of corporations and independent
expenditures is justified (at least in part) because of strict
disclosure rules, then evidence that there actually is very weak
disclosure should cast doubt on the Court’s conclusion that
corporations and unions should be free to spend in elections.
For the Court to adopt this dynamic interpretive posture, it
may have to rely more on as-applied challenges in order to evaluate
the implementation of challenged regulations and the hydraulic
relationship between political actors, their behavior, and the
political environment of each case.133 Indeed, although not
motivated by the normative hydraulic theory, courts have shifted
toward as-applied challenges in election administration cases in
recent years.134 Campaign finance cases have not followed suit
(yet). One argument for the tolerance of more wiggle room in
campaign finance cases is found in Federalist No. 37, where James
Madison argued that vague rules and standards ought to be
tolerated in areas where outcomes are unknown, so they can be
amended later with greater specificity as “ascertained by a series
of particular discussions and adjudications.”135 Whatever the case,
facts matter, and empirical evidence should be especially relevant
to the disposition of politically charged cases.

133. Note that the hydraulic theory of campaign finance conflates opportunity with
strategic decisionmaking. Paul Herrnson refers to this as the entrepreneurial theory of
politics. PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN
WASHINGTON 36–38 (7th ed. 2016); see MICHAEL J. MALBIN, LIFE AFTER REFORM: WHEN THE
BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 4 (2003) (“But people and
organizations are not made of water. Therefore, some will be better positioned than others
to shift.”).
134. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied
Challenges in Election Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2009) (charting the shift toward asapplied challenges in election law cases, and constitutional adjudication more generally,
after the Supreme Court upheld Washington state’s blanket primary system against a facial
challenge in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442
(2008)).
135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
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V. CONCLUSION
My goal in writing this Article is to challenge the increasing
partisanship about basic facts underlying the regulation of
campaigns, voting, and politics. Because we lack a consensus about
how to even measure risk, our scholarship, statutes, and judicial
opinions are littered with hypotheticals, and the scary refrain that
“there’s no way to know for sure!” Republicans repeat this chorus
in exasperated tones about voter fraud while Democrats are
equally breathless about “dark money” in campaign finance. But
we actually do know some things. For example, we know that voter
fraud is low because we can audit voter lists and look for the names
of noncitizens, those who have died, and double-entries. Indeed, we
uncover dozens of cases of fraudulent voting after each election,
but never more than a small fraction, say 0.001% or less,136 of
overall ballots cast (and nowhere close to millions).137 The caveat,
of course, is that this information is only available ex post, which
is not ideal, though punitive measures can serve as a deterrent. In
campaign finance, there is no transparency, even ex post, about
hundreds of millions of dollars. Yet, we know something about
undisclosed money; for example, that undisclosed dollars amount
to less than five percent of all spending, and that it is two to three
times more likely to be spent in support of conservative candidates
and issues.138 These facts, often ignored, matter! Although the
empirics are incomplete, they provide context to incredibly
important debates, and illustrate the relationship between various
dimensions of political regulation. Understanding the nuanced
relationship between campaign finance rules and regulations, and
the strategic reactions by political actors in today’s highly
polarized environment may exceed the ability of the judiciary.
Indeed, judges are not fortune tellers. However, ignoring empirical
data because it is incomplete is like choosing to walk naked in a
snowstorm because your parka doesn’t have a hood. A more
productive, and less partisan, debate about money in politics must
take risk assessment seriously, must confront the empirics, and

136. David Becker, Just the Facts of Fraud, CTR. FOR ELECTION INNOVATION & RES. (May
1, 2017), https://www.electioninnovation.org/news/2017/5/1/just-the-facts-on-fraud.
137. Donald J. Trump, TWITTER (Nov. 27, 2016, 12:30 PM), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/802972944532209664?lang=en.
138. Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), supra note 49.
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must be honest about the scope of reform. Otherwise, the
hypotheticals will swallow reality.

